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COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
FUTURE POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DIRECTIONS 
GABRIEL J. CHIN*
National policy with respect to collateral consequences is receiving more 
attention than it has in decades.  This article outlines and explains some of the 
reasons for the new focus.  The legal system is beginning to recognize that for 
many people convicted of crime, the greatest effect is not imprisonment, but 
being marked as a criminal and subjected to legal disabilities.  Consequences 
can include loss of civil rights, loss of public benefits, and ineligibility for 
employment, licenses, and permits.  The United States, the 50 states, and their 
agencies and subdivisions impose collateral consequences—often applicable 
for life—based on convictions from any jurisdiction.  However, because they 
were deemed “civil,” collateral consequences have been created and imposed 
with few constitutional limitations. 
In recent years, the American Law Institute, American Bar Association, and 
Uniform Law Commission all have proposed reforms, which are now being 
seriously considered in a number of jurisdictions.  Meanwhile, scholars have 
advanced, and courts have sometimes accepted, an argument that they 
previously rejected, namely that collateral consequences can be of 
constitutional magnitude.  As courts take collateral consequences more 
* Edward L. Barrett Jr. Chair & Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law; 
founding board member, Collateral Consequences Resource Center (http://ccresourcecenter.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/4TMY-AJMZ]); Reporter, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ON 
COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (2004), 
and UNIFORM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (2010).  Thanks to Margy Love for 
comments, to the editors of the Marquette Law Review for expert editing, and to Dean Joseph Kearney 
and the faculty of the Marquette Law School for the opportunity to present a version of this paper as 
the Barrock Lecture.  It draws on Gabriel J. Chin, Collateral Consequences, in 4 REFORMING 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION, AND RELEASE 371 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), 
http://academyforjustice.org/volume4/ [https://perma.cc/9EVM-834T] [hereinafter 4 REFORMING 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE]; Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral 
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675 (2011) [hereinafter Chin, Making Padilla Practical]; 
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seriously, legislatures have begun to reduce the numbers of collateral 
consequences and provide legal mechanisms for the relief of those that remain.   
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I. INTRODUCTION
After decades of obscurity, collateral consequences seem to be moving into 
the spotlight of the United States legal system.1  Everyone knows that a 
conviction may result in imprisonment, fine, probation, or parole.  Until 
1. The mainstreaming of collateral consequences may be symbolized by the fact that John Oliver 
dedicated the November 8, 2015, episode of his HBO show Last Week Tonight to the issue of prisoner 
reentry and addressed a number of collateral consequences. LastWeekTonight, Prisoner Re-entry: Last 
Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE (Nov. 8, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gJtYRxH5G2k [https://perma.cc/J4SL-FVNQ]. 
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relatively recently, even among lawyers, few understood that people with 
criminal convictions face a network of additional legal effects, known as 
collateral consequences.2  This was unfortunate, because collateral 
consequences affect many areas of life, often more significantly than traditional 
forms of punishment.  Some criminal convictions can lead to loss of civil status; 
a citizen may lose the right to vote, serve on a jury, or hold office; a non-citizen 
may be deported or become ineligible to naturalize.3  A conviction may make a 
person ineligible for public benefits, such as the ability to live in public housing 
??? ????? ?? ????????? ????????4  Criminal convictions affect employment; laws 
prohibit hiring of people with convictions as peace officers or as employees for 
the health-care industry.5  A criminal conviction can also make a person 
ineligible for a license or permit necessary to be employed or to do business; it 
can cause the forfeiture of a pension.6  Criminal convictions can also affect 
family relations, such as the ability to have custody of or visitation with ??????
child.7  While criminal convictions have serious nonlegal effects, such as stigma 
or shame, the focus of this article is on legal mandates.8
In the last half of the twentieth century, courts invalidated few, if any, 
collateral consequences, ruling that they were civil regulatory measures which 
were tested against deferential standards of review associated with other 
economic regulations and were not subject to the restraints imposed by the Bill 
of Rights on criminal punishment.9  However, starting in the new millennium, 
courts and important actors began to notice collateral consequences and think 
about how they can be integrated into the legal system.  In 2004, the American 
Bar Association (ABA) promulgated ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: 
Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons.10
2. Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1103?04 
(2013). 
3. Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note *, at 1800. 
4. Id. at 1801, 1827; see also Gwen Rubenstein & Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and Housing–
Denial of Benefits to Drug Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 37, at 43?44 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
5. Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note *, at 1800; see also DiCola v. FDA, 77 F.3d 504, 507 
(D.C. Cir. 1996).  
6. Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note *, at 1801. 
7. Id. at 1800. 
8. Th????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? See Logan, supra
note 2, at 1104?05. 
9. State v. Meadows, No. A13?1023, 2014 WL 3396238, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. July 14, 2014).
10. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY 
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (AM. BAR ASS?N 2004) [hereinafter ABA CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STANDARD]. 
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The Uniform Law Commission (ULC) promulgated the Uniform Collateral 
Consequences of Conviction Act in 2009, and the American Law Institute 
(ALI) amended the Model Penal Code sentencing provisions to address 
collateral consequences in 2017.11  As a result, jurisdictions imposing collateral 
consequences have a wealth of carefully considered policy recommendations 
and statutory models to improve their laws. 
The courts have also been active.  In 2010, the Supreme Court issued its 
landmark decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,12 overruling scores of lower court 
cases to hold that counsel had an obligation to advise noncitizen clients about 
the possibility of deportation following a conviction.13  More recently (in 2017), 
the Court, per Justice Anthony Kennedy, offered a broader suggestion of doubt 
about the network of collateral consequences.  In the course of an opinion 
invalidating a prohibition on sex offenders accessing the internet, the Court 
???????? ???? ???????????? ???? ?????????? ????? ????? ???? ???? ???????? ???????
restrictions on persons who already have served their sentence and are no longer 
subject to the supervision of the criminal justice system is also not an issue 
??????????? ??????14  Similarly, state courts and lower federal courts have found 
that particular collateral consequences violate state and federal constitutional 
guarantees.15  State legislatures have also responded, with many of them 
increasing access to relief methods or otherwise relieving collateral 
consequences.16
Part II of this article outlines the policy problem of collateral consequences 
in a nation with tens of millions of members with criminal records.  Part III 
describes the reforms proposed by the ABA, ULC, and ALI.  Part IV proposes 
that a steady stream of court decisions have been chipping away at the 
functional immunity collateral consequences previously enjoyed.  In addition, 
scholars have developed arguments that the federal Constitution or the 
11. See UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (amended 2010) (NAT?L
CONFERENCE OF COMM?RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2011), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/uccca_final_10.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DT68-KA5N] [hereinafter UCCCA]; MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6x (AM.
LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft, approved 2017). 
12. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
13. Id. at 374. 
14. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737?38 (2017). 
15. Doe v. Cooper, 842 F.3d 833, 838 (4th Cir. 2016); Does v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705 (6th 
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017); Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1223 (Pa. 
2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 925 (2018). 
16. See COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., FOUR YEARS OF SECOND CHANCE REFORMS,
2013?2016: RESTORATION OF RIGHTS & RELIEF FROM COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 1 (2017), 
http://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/4-YEARS-OF-SECOND-CHANCE-
REFORMS-CCRC.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4ZS-WBWN]. 
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constitutions of the states require more searching review, portending a 
continuing flow of legal challenges.   
The article concludes by predicting that the combination of institutional 
support for policy change, along with the threat of imposition by constitutional 
law, will speed the process of reform and bring collateral consequences into the 
criminal justice system for purposes.  Instead of being invisible, collateral 
consequences will be consciously limited to those that are necessary, will be 
????? ??? ???????? ????????? duties with respect to plea bargaining and client 
counselling, and will be taken into account at sentencing. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
A. Mass Conviction 
The United States is in an era of mass conviction.  Many distinguished 
commentators ???????????????? ???????????? ???????????????17  Since 1970, and 
even more profoundly since 1980, the increase in the rate of imprisonment and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????18  In 1980, more than 500,000 Americans were 
confined to prisons and jails; in 2015, there were over 2.1 million.19
17. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2010); TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS 
INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007); Todd R. Clear & James 
Austin, Mass Incarceration, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note *, at 55; MARIE 
GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN 
AMERICA (2006); DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS 
INCARCERATION (2007); Joseph E. Kennedy, The Jena Six, Mass Incarceration, and the 
Remoralization of Civil Rights, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 477 (2009); Ian F. Haney López, Post-
Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1023 (2010); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African 
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004); Jonathan Simon, Consuming Obsessions: 
Housing, Homicide, and Mass Incarceration Since 1950, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 165; Anthony C. 
Thompson, Unlocking Democracy: Examining the Collateral Consequences of Mass Incarceration on 
Black Political Power, 54 HOW. L.J. 587 (2011); James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass 
Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993 (2010) (reviewing PAUL BUTLER, LET?S GET FREE: A HIP-
HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (2009)).  
18. Jude McCulloch & Phil Scraton, The Violence of Incarceration: An Introduction, in THE 
VIOLENCE OF INCARCERATION 1, 14 (Phil Scraton & Jude McCulloch eds., 2009). 
19. DANIELLE KAEBLE & LAUREN GLAZE, U.S. DEP?T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 250374,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015, at 2 tbl.1 (2016); see also ALLEN J. BECK 
& DARRELL K. GILLIARD, U.S. DEP?T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 151654, PRISONERS IN 1994, at 2 (1995). 
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??????????????????????????????????????20 obscures the reality that prison is 
not the default tool of the criminal justice system.  There are approximately one 
million new state felony convictions in a typical year21 and many more 
misdemeanor convictions.22  In addition, there are approximately 80,000 federal 
convictions annually.23  Most defendants convicted of felonies are not 
sentenced to state prison?about 60% receive probation only or probation with 
jail.24  Even more misdemeanor convictions do not result in incarceration.25
While sentence length has increased, the average term is less than five years.26
Accordingly, it is likely that the vast majority of even those convicted of 
felonies and sentenced to prison will spend most of their lives in free society.  
20. ?????? ???? ??????? ?????? ??????????????? ????? ???? ???????? ???? ????? ??????? ??? ???????????
consequences, this observation is not meant to imply that scholars using the phrase are unaware of the 
collateral consequences of criminal conviction, or have not paid enough attention to them in their 
scholarship.  The observation is about the limits of the term, not about the work of those who use it. 
21. E.g., SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., U.S. DEP?T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 226846, FELONY 
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006?STATISTICAL TABLES 1 tbl.1 (2009). 
22. See KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP?T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 2015, at 16 (2016) 
(reporting 1.158 million arrests in California in 2015, of which 314,748 were for felonies and the 
remainder for misdemeanors or status offenses); COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK 
OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 24 (2012) (reporting that 
misdemeanors comprised a majority of the criminal caseload in a 2010 study of seventeen states); 
LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP?T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 228538, PUBLIC DEFENDER 
OFFICES, 2007?STATISTICAL TABLES 12 tbl.5a (2010) (reporting that public defenders surveyed were 
assigned a total of 378,400 felony and 575,770 misdemeanor cases in 2007); Alexandra Natapoff, 
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1320 n.25 (2012) (estimating 10.5 million nontraffic 
misdemeanors annually (citing NAT?L ASS?N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES,
MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA?S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 
(2009))). See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, in 1 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
INTRODUCTION AND CRIMINALIZATION 71 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), 
http://academyforjustice.org/volume1/ [https://perma.cc/PMJ3-N95K]. Systematic misdemeanor 
statistics are not readily available, but it is clear that misdemeanor convictions are more common than 
felony convictions. 
23. See U.S. DEP?T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 231822, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2008?STATISTICAL 
TABLES tbl.5.1 (2010) (reporting 82,823 federal convictions in the year ending September 30, 2008, of 
which 75,832 were felonies). 
24. ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 21, at 4 tbl.1.2. 
25. Natapoff, supra note 22, at 82?84.  However, even those not incarcerated can be caught up 
in the system because of the obligation to pay fines, costs, and assessments. See generally ALEXES 
HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR (2016); 
Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175, 
1176?77, 1185 (2014). 
26. State prison sentences averaged fifty-nine months. ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 21, at 
6 tbl.1.3.  Federal sentences averaged just over five years. U.S. DEP?T OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 
tbl.5.2. 
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Those convicted but not incarcerated are typically on probation or parole.27
About 7 million people were on probation or parole at some point during 
2015,28 more than three times the number in prison or jail.29  At the broadest 
level, approximately 75 million adults have a criminal record, although some 
records involve arrests not leading to conviction.30  Accordingly, the size of the 
offender population is not just the 2 million in custody; it also includes the more 
than 7 million in the control of the criminal justice system who are not in 
custody, plus the tens of millions with a record. 
Not being incarcerated does not mean that a person with a conviction has 
escaped legal consequences.31 ??????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????32  Every conviction implies a 
permanent change, because these disabilit??????????????????????????????33  For 
27. See generally Michael Tonry, Community Punishments, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, supra note *, at 187. 
28. DANIELLE KAEBLE & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP?T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND 
PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015, at 3 tbl.1, 4 fig.4, 5 fig.5 (2017).  This figure includes 4.71 
million on probation or parole at year-end 2014, plus 1.9 million probation entries, and 475,200 parole 
entries. Id. 
29. See id.; see also KAEBLE & GLAZE, supra note 19. 
30. MADELINE NEIGHLY & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT?L EMP?T LAW PROJECT, WANTED:
ACCURATE FBI BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT ?????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ???????? ???????? ??? ????? ????? ??? ???????? ?????????????? see also MICHELLE NATIVIDAD 
RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT?L EMP?T LAW PROJECT, 65 MILLION ??EED NOT APPLY??
THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 27 n.2 (2011). 
31. See generally MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & CECELIA KLINGELE,
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2016); JEFF 
MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 71 (2006); CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES (Christopher Mele & Theresa A. 
Miller eds., 2005); NAT?L ASS?N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AMERICA?S
FAILURE TO FORGIVE OR FORGET IN THE WAR ON CRIME, A ROADMAP TO RESTORE RIGHTS AND 
STATUS AFTER ARREST OR CONVICTION 12, 22 (2014); JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK:
FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY (2005).  See also INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra note 4; Nora V. Demleitner, 
Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 
STAN. L. & POL?Y REV. 153, 154 (1999). 
32. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946); see also Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 
????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????
33. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222 (1946); see also Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 
593?94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) ???????????????? ?? ??????? ?????????? status upon a person 
which not only makes him vulnerable to future sanctions through new civil disability statutes, but 
which also ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.
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citizens, a prominent collateral consequence is the loss of civil rights:34 ???
convicted criminal may be disenfranchised, . . . lose the right to hold federal or 
state office, . . . be barred from entering certain professions, . . . be subject to 
impeachment when testifying as a witness, . . . be disqualified from serving as 
?? ???????35 and lose the right to keep and bear arms.36  For non-citizens, 
conviction may result in deportation.37
Collateral consequences are sometimes triggered by specific offenses;38
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????39
Some apply automatically, while others authorize a regulator to act on a case-
by-case basis.40  Some apply for a specified term, others apply for life.41
The effects of the loss of status are particularly profound given the many 
areas of life now subject to governmental regulation.  Conviction potentially 
affects many aspects of family relations, including, for example, the ability to 
adopt, be a foster parent, or retain custody of children.42  Conviction can make 
one ineligible for public employment, such as in the military and law 
34. 50 State Comparison: Loss and Restoration of Civil Rights & Firearm Rights, RESTORATION 
OF RIGHTS PROJECT, http://ccresourcecenter.org/resources-2/restoration-of-rights/chart-1-loss-and-
restoration-of-civil-rights-and-firearms-privileges/ [https://perma.cc/2RN9-QV8N] (last updated Aug. 
2018).  See generally LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY (2004) 
(discussing the legal barriers facing individuals following a criminal conviction). 
35. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 247 n.1 (1971); see also PIPPA HOLLOWAY, LIVING 
IN INFAMY: FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2014); 
MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 31, at 71; Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of 
Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1045?46. 
36. LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, §§ 2:29?37; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
??????????????????[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions 
on the possession of firearms by felons????? ????????? ??? ???????? Firearms and Violence, in 1 
REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 167, 178?79. 
37. LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, §§ 2:47?61; see also ??????????????????? ???????????????????????
is well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a 
?????????????.  For discussions of the nature of deportation, see Jennifer M. Chacón, Criminalizing 
Immigration, in 1 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 205, 207; Kari Hong, The 
Absurdity of Crime-Based Deportation, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2067, 2074 (2017); Christopher N. 
Lasch, “Crimmigration” and the Right to Counsel at the Border Between Civil and Criminal 
Proceedings, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2131, 2132 (2014); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil–Criminal 
Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 350 (2008). 
38. See, e.g., Joann Sahl, Can We Forgive Those Who Batter? Proposing an End to the Collateral 
Consequences of Civil Domestic Violence Cases, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 527 (2016). 
39. See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 191?92 n.1, 197 (1898). 
40. Demleitner, supra note 31, at 154. 
41. Id.
42. Philip M. Genty, Family-Related Consequences, in LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, §§ 2:25?28. 
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enforcement.43  A criminal record can preclude private employment in a 
regulated industry,44 with certain government contractors, or in positions 
requiring security clearances.45   
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
obtain government licenses and permits,46 to live in public housing,47 to receive 
other benefits, or to collect a vested public pension.48  Those convicted of 
certain crimes may lose the right to drive a car.49  Persons convicted of sex 
offenses often must register, may be excluded from living in particular areas, 
43. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 504 (2012) (restricting enlistment of people with convictions) 
(discussed in LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 2:7); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.13(4) (West 2017) 
(prohibiting employment as law enforcement officer of those convicted of felonies and certain 
misdemeanors). 
44. For example, the court in DiCola v. FDA upheld lifetime debarment from the pharmaceutical 
industry based on a criminal conviction: 
The permanence of the debarment can be understood, without reference to punitive 
intent, as reflecting a congressional judgment that the integrity of the drug industry, 
and with it public confidence in that industry, will suffer if those who manufacture 
drugs use the services of someone who has committed a felony subversive of FDA 
regulation. . . . That judgment may proceed from a skeptical view of the 
malleability of individual men and women, . . . or from a greater concern with the 
cost of an error visited upon the public than with the cost of an error felt only by 
the excluded felon, . . . or more likely from the cumulative force of both 
sentiments. 
77 F.3d 504, 507?08 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
45. Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note *, at 1800. 
46. Id. at 1801; LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, §§ 2:8?16.  The Supreme Court upheld a prohibition 
on licensing people convicted of crime: 
It is not open to doubt that the commission of crime, the violation of the penal laws 
of a State, has some relation to the question of character.  It is not, as a rule, the 
good people who commit crime.  When the legislature declares that whoever has 
violated the criminal laws of the State shall be deemed lacking in good moral 
character, it is not laying down an arbitrary or fanciful rule?one having no relation 
to the subject-matter, but is only appealing to a well-recognized fact of human 
experience. 
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898). 
47. LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 2:17; Ann Cammett, Confronting Race and Collateral 
Consequences in Public Housing, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1123, 1124 (2016); Lahny R. Silva, 
Collateral Damage: A Public Housing Consequence of the “War on Drugs,” 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
783, 785 (2015). 
48. LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, §§ 2:19?21; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343 
(Pa. 2012). 
49. LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 2:23; see also 23 U.S.C. § 159 (2012) (requiring states to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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and can be subject to post-incarceration civil commitment.50  Criminal records 
are increasingly available to all branches of the government and all segments 
of the public through computer databases, thus making collateral consequences 
susceptible to ready enforcement,51 although some states provide for limited 
access to conviction records.52
At the same time, the legal effects of a conviction are hard to eliminate.  
Some collateral consequences, by their terms, apply only for a specified period, 
while others are in effect for life.  Although all jurisdictions have some method 
of eliminating the effects of the conviction, such as pardon, sealing, or 
expungement,53 often relief is practically unavailable or is restricted to a narrow 
class of convictions or offenders.54
B. The Late Twentieth Century Judicial View: Collateral Consequences are 
Non-Criminal 
In spite of the prevalence of collateral consequences?or perhaps because 
of it?federal constitutional law regulates them minimally.  The Supreme Court 
has held that occupational ineligibility,55 deportation,56 sex-offender 
50. LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, §§ 2:38?46; see also WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS 
POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 49?51 
(2009); Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Notification, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, supra note *, at 397, 403. 
51. See Christopher Slobogin, Policing, Databases, and Surveillance, in 2 REFORMING 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POLICING 209, 210, 213 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), 
http://academyforjustice.org/volume2/ [https://perma.cc/8XTW-HMFZ]; Alessandro Corda, More 
Justice and Less Harm: Reinventing Access to Criminal History Records, 60 HOW. L.J. 1, 15?16
(2016).  See generally JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD (2015).  Even juvenile 
records are available to the public in some states. Joy Radice, The Juvenile Record Myth, 106 GEO.
L.J. 365, 365 (2018). 
52. Margaret Love, Restrictions on Access to Criminal Records: A National Survey,
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (Mar. 9, 2017), 
http://ccresourcecenter.org/2017/03/09/restrictions-on-access-to-criminal-records-a-national-
survey/#more-11938 [https://perma.cc/N7GN-BCGB]. 
53. Id.; see also 50 State Comparison: Judicial Expungement, Sealing, and Set-aside,
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., http://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-
state-comparisonjudicial-expungement-sealing-and-set-aside/ [https://perma.cc/MTJ8-JUCT] (last 
updated Aug. 2018). 
54. Love, supra note 52. 
55. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 190, 197 (1898). 
56. ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
date for applying the ex post facto Clause, it has been the unbroken rule of this Court that it has no 
??????????????????????????????
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registration,57 and civil commitment58 are not subject to the prohibitions on ex 
post facto laws, although some specific registration regimes have been held so 
restrictive as to constitute punishment59 or require individualized 
determinations.60  The Court has also ruled that people with convictions may 
be disenfranchised61 and denied the right to possess firearms.62  Many courts 
have held that collateral consequences are not punishment and thus are not 
covered by the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishments63 or the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy.64
While scholars have criticized collateral consequences as 
disproportionately falling on people of color,65 courts hold that people with 
convictions are not a suspect class under the equal protection doctrine, so 
legislation disadvantaging them is permissible if it passes lenient rational-basis 
review.66  Lower courts occasionally find particular restrictions irrational;67
however, under the approach of most courts, saving money will almost always 
be a satisfactory reason for denying benefits;68 denial of licensure or 
57. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 104?06 (2003). 
58. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997). 
59. LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 2:43. 
60. In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 19 (Pa. 2014). 
61. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974). 
62. See supra note 36. 
63. See, e.g., ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????47 (3d Cir. 
2015); People v. Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 43; State v. Meadows, No. A13?1023, 2014 WL 3396238, 
at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. July 14, 2014). 
64. See, e.g., Crook v. Galaviz, No. EP?14?CV?193?KC, 2015 WL 502305, at *9 (W.D. Tex. 
Feb. 5, 2015), aff’d????????????????????????????????????????????????????????CJ-CID, No. 6:08cv324, 
2008 WL 5412383, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2008); Urciuolo v. Commonwealth, 684 A.2d 1094, 1096 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996). 
65. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 253, 254 (2002); Bernice B. Donald, Effectively 
Addressing Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions on Individuals and Communities, CRIM.
JUST., Winter 2016, at 1, 1; George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the 
Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1899?1900 (1999); Michael Pinard, Collateral 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
457, 470?71 (2010); see also Cassia Spohn, Race and Sentencing Disparity, in 4 REFORMING 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note *, at 169, 169?71. 
66. Talley v. Lane, 13 F.3d 1031, 1034?35 (7th Cir. 1994). 
67. ????????? ??? ????????? ???? ??? ?????? ??? ????? ???? ???? ?????? ?????? ????????? ?????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????s trading 
???????????????????????????????
68. Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1363?????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
constitutes a rational basis on which to deny assistance to ??????????????????????????????????????
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employment is justified to protect public safety69 or to promote public 
confidence in government70 or a regulated industry.71
In the criminal context, most courts hold that a judge accepting a guilty plea 
must warn of the direct consequences, but not of collateral consequences.72
Similarly, while the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to offer 
competent representation, most courts hold that counsel need not advise of 
collateral consequences.73
There are two exceptions.  First, affirmative misadvice, even about a 
collateral consequence, may be incompetent even if there was no obligation to 
offer correct advice in the first place.74
 The second major exception is the collateral consequence of deportation.  
By statute or court rule, many jurisdictions required advice of the possibility of 
69. ?????????????????????????????????????????????-5624, 1994 WL 395054, at *1 (5th Cir. July 
7, 1994) (stating that an e?????????? ???????????? ???????????? ????tes to maintaining security and 
safety???
70. ?????????? ????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????in the honesty and integrity of those serving in state 
???????????????????????????does not dispute the legitimacy of this interest, nor has he argued that the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????People v. Hofer, 843 N.E.2d 460, 464 (Ill. Ct. App. 
2006)). 
71. See DiCola v. FDA, 77 F.3d 504, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
72. State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676, 682???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Fourteenth Amendment a sentencing court must insure the defendant understands the direct 
consequences of the plea including the possible maximum sentence, as well as any mandatory 
minimum punishment. However, the court is not required to inform the defendant of all indirect and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????State v. Carney, 584 N.W.2d 907, 908 (Iowa 1998) 
(per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v. Washington, 37 N.Y.S.3d 867, 870 (Sup. 
Ct. 2016???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
guilty plea that are personal to each defendant.  Accordingly, the courts have drawn a distinction 
between consequences of which the defendant must be advised, those which are direct, and those of 
?????? ???? ?????????? ????? ???? ??? ????????? ??????????? ??????????????? (quoting People v. Ford, 657 
N.E.2d 265, 267 (N.Y. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jenia I. Turner, Plea
Bargaining, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 73, 77?78 (Erik 
Luna ed., 2017), http://academyforjustice.org/volume3/ [https://perma.cc/4NCQ-X4ES]. 
73. State v. LeMere, 2016 WI 41, ¶ 69, 368 Wis. 2d 624, 662, 879 N.W.2d 580, 598?99; see also 
Brian M. Murray, Beyond the Right to Counsel: Increasing Notice of Collateral Consequences, 49 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1142, 1160 (2015).  See generally Thea Johnson, Measuring the Creative Plea 
Bargain, 92 IND. L.J. 901 (2017). 
74. State v. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531, 538?39 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017); People v. Dodds, 
2014 IL App (1st) 122268, ¶¶ 38?39; see also United States v. Castro-Taveras, 841 F.3d 34, 51 (1st 
Cir. 2016).  
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deportation.75  In Padilla v. Kentucky,76 the Supreme Court held that effective 
assistance of counsel entitled clients pleading guilty to a warning of the 
possibility of deportation.77  Lower courts are now working out the question of 
whether defense counsel must advise of other serious collateral consequences, 
such as sex-offender registration or incarceration.78
While collateral consequences can be mitigated through pardon and other 
forms of legal relief,79 pardon was a much more realistic hope for convicted 
persons in the past than it is now.80  Finally, while historically disabilities 
applied only in the jurisdiction of conviction,81 a conviction in one jurisdiction 
now often has effects nationwide.82  Often a jurisdiction will impose a disability 
without regard to whether the jurisdiction of conviction does so.83
75. Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 708 (2002). 
76. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).  The Supreme Court has recognized the significance of collateral 
consequences in the context of habeas corpus petitions; the existence of collateral consequences can 
prevent mootness where a defendant has been released from custody. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,
391 n.4 (1985). 
77. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374. 
78. LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 4.7. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 60. 
79. See LOVE ET AL., supra note 31, Ch. 7 & ?????? ?-10 to A-63; 50 State Comparison: 
Characteristics of Pardon Authorities, RESTORATION OF RIGHTS PROJECT,
http://ccresourcecenter.org/resources-2/restoration-of-rights/50-state-comparisoncharacteristics-of-
pardon-authorities/ [https://perma.cc/5US7-DFC6] (last updated June 2018).  The Collateral 
Consequences Resource Center maintains a comprehensive, updated list of all legal mechanisms for 
relief of collateral consequences. State-Specific Resources, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR.,
http://ccresourcecenter.org/resources-2/state-specific-resources/ [https://perma.cc/5BHE-4SJK] (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
80. See Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1181?????????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
thousands of petitions filed were sent forward to the White House with a favorable official 
recommendation.  At the White House, the president usually approved cases recommended 
favorably . . . ???? ??????????????????? ????????? ??? ????????????? id. at 1192 (noting that during the 
administrations of Presidents Kennedy through Carter, pardon grant rates ranged from 30?40%); see 
also LOVE ET AL., supra ????? ???? ??? ?????? ?-6 (discussing pardon practices in the states).  See 
generally Mark Osler, Clemency, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note *, at 419, 429. 
81. See Huntington v. Attrill, 1???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the law of a State, as an incident or consequence of a judicial sentence or decree, by way of punishment 
of an offender, and not for the benefit of any other person . . . are doubtless strictly penal, and therefore 
have no extra-?????????????????????????
82. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.23(1)(e) (West 2009) (denying firearms rights to those 
convicted in other states). 
83. In Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 26 (2007), for example, a defendant with three state 
battery convictions was prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law; the law in the state of 
conviction imposed no such prohibition. See also HAW. REV. STAT. § 846E-1 (2016) (defining 
?????????? ????????? ??? ???????? ?any federal, military, or out-of-state conviction for any offense that 
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Ironically, collateral consequences are more important for relatively less 
serious crimes.84  If a person is sentenced to 25 years imprisonment at hard 
labor, it likely matters little that she will be ineligible to become a licensed 
accountant upon release.  Someone convicted of bank fraud cannot expect to 
remain in or return to work in a financial institution whether or not she goes to 
prison.  But a person sentenced to unsupervised probation and a $250 fine for a 
minor offense suffers a catastrophic loss if she loses her job or is unable to 
teach, care for the elderly, live in public housing, or be a foster parent to a 
relative.  This is particularly so if no one told her about it in advance or 
considered possible alternative plea bargains that could have avoided the 
catastrophic consequences.  If the requirements of due process are to be 
established by looking at the private and governmental interests at stake, and 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation,85 there is a strong argument that the 
balance has been drawn in the wrong place. 
III. THE ORGANIZED BAR RESPONDS: REFORM OF COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES
Historically, collateral consequences of criminal conviction were not 
particularly important to the legal system because the penalty for felony was 
death.86  Conviction of felony resulted in a single major collateral consequence, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
end his natural life.87  As prison terms replaced automatic capital punishment, 
and therefore most people convicted of crimes ultimately reentered free society, 
civil death came to be regarded as too harsh.88  In the mid-twentieth century, it 
????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ?? ????? ???????????Elections: Effect 
of Conviction Under Federal Law, or Law of Another State or Country, on Right to Vote or Hold Public 
Office, 39 A.L.R.3d 303, 305, 313?14 (1971). 
84. See, e.g., Brandon Buskey & Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Keeping Gideon’s Promise: Using Equal 
Protection to Address the Denial of Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2299, 2313 
(2017); Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738, 758, 763
(2017); Jenny Roberts, Informed Misdemeanor Sentencing, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 171?72 (2017).  
85. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334?35 (1976). 
86. Mirjan R. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal: A 
Comparative Study, 59 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 347, 351 (1968); see also Margaret 
Colgate Love, Starting Over With a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal 
Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1714, 1733 (2003).  See generally Mirjan R. Damaska, Adverse 
Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal: A Comparative Study (Part 2), 59 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 542 (1968). 
87. See generally Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note * (describing historical punishment of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????
88. Id. at 1797. 
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appeared that collateral consequences might fade away as civil death had.89  But 
the rise of mass conviction, along with the general increase of government 
regulation in society, created a system of collateral consequences.90
In their creation and administration, collateral consequences were not part 
of a rational, systematic, careful policy.91  But there is, of course, a substantial 
public interest in public safety, which includes the idea that people with 
convictions who have the capacity to live law-abiding lives should be 
encouraged to do so.92  Starting in the early years of the twenty-first century, 
the organized bar responded.  The ABA Criminal Justice Standards were 
promulgated in 2004,93 ????????????????????????????????????????????????
Consequences of Conviction Act in 2010,94 ?????????????????????????????????
revised sentencing provisions in 2017.95
A. Collection of Collateral Consequences. 
Their basic approaches to the issue shared important similarities.  The 
ABA, ULC, and ALI agreed that a critical first step in managing collateral 
consequences is collecting, publishing, and updating a compendium cataloging 
all collateral consequences.96  Congress and state legislatures have made 
imposing collateral consequences a central function of the criminal justice 
system; it is as if there is a title of the U.S. Code, and the code of every state, 
regu??????? ??????????? ????????? ??? ???? ????? ???? ??? ??????? ???? ???? ????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
governing convicted persons are scattered throughout codes and regulations, 
89. Id. at 1798. 
90. Id. at 1791. 
91. See Joshua Kaiser, Revealing the Hidden Sentence: How to Add Transparency, Legitimacy, 
and Purpose to “Collateral” Punishment Policy, 10 HARV. L. & POL?Y REV. 123, 156?71, 179 (2016). 
92. Joy Radice, The Reintegrative State, 66 EMORY L.J. 1315, 1318 (2017). 
93. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARD, supra note 10. 
94. UCCCA, supra note 11; see also Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: 
Forgiveness, Redemption, and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J.
753, 759 (2011). 
95. In 2017, the American Law Institute approved revisions of the sentencing articles of the 
Model Penal Code that make imposition of collateral consequences, and relief from them, part of the 
sentencing process. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 11; see also Margaret Colgate 
Love, Managing Collateral Consequences in the Sentencing Process: The Revised Sentencing Articles 
of the Model Penal Code, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 247, 250?51. 
96. UCCCA, supra note 11, § 4; MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 11, § 6x.02(1); 
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARD, supra note 10, Standard 19-2.1. 
248 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:233 
and individuals charged with crimes generally cannot hire lawyers to comb the 
laws and produce a compendium containing all relevant provisions.97
Congress agreed that a compilation was a necessary beginning and provided 
for the funding of the creation of a compendium in the Court Security 
Improvement Act of 2007.98  The National Inventory of Collateral 
Consequences of Conviction,99 initially compiled by the ABA and now 
maintained by the Council of State Governments, is an important development, 
although it is not complete or completely accurate.  
In addition, in some jurisdictions, public defenders or others have created 
state guides to collateral consequences.100  Often, these guides do not list all 
collateral consequences applicable to every crime.101  Instead, they selectively 
identify the most serious and common collateral consequences, collateral 
consequences applicable to the most common offenses, and collateral 
consequences most important to the population typically in the criminal justice 
system, that is, those who are relatively less affluent.102  There should be such 
guides in every state; again, they should be regularly updated and made 
available to all lawyers and judges.103
B. Collateral Consequences In the Plea and Sentence Process 
In spite of the importance of collateral consequences to individuals, before 
Padilla v. Kentucky,104 most courts held that counsel and the court had no duty 
to advise the client about the collateral consequences resulting from the 
conviction.105 Padilla????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the possibility of deportation was important and may portend extensions to 
other collateral consequences, perhaps under state constitutional 
97. Chin, Making Padilla Practical, supra note *, at 684?85. 
98. Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, § 510, 121 Stat. 2534, 2543?
44 (2008). 
99. National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, JUSTICE CTR.: THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV?TS, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org [https://perma.cc/AJ5Y-PZHV] (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2018). 
100. See Compilations & Inventories, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR.,
http://ccresourcecenter.org/compilations-inventories-of-collateral-consequences/ 
[https://perma.cc/9A7L-UE85] (last visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
101. See Chin, Making Padilla Practical, supra note *, at 687. 
102. Id. at 689?90. 
103. Id. at 687, 690?91. 
104. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
105. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 75, at 699. 
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interpretations.  ?????????????? ????? ??????? ????????? ??? ????? ????? ??????????
responsibility does not extend to collateral consequences beyond deportation.106
The UCCCA,107 ABA Standards,108 and Model Penal Code109 all recognize 
the importance of counselling clients about collateral consequences generally.  
????? ???????? ????????? ???? ???? ????????? ?????????? ??????? ??? ??????? ????????
attention to collateral consequences. 
1. Plea bargaining and charging negotiations 
Counsel can help the client in plea bargaining through knowledge of 
collateral consequences.  In Padilla, the Supreme Court noted that 
informed consideration of possible deportation can only 
benefit both the State and noncitizen defendants during the 
plea-bargaining process. By bringing deportation 
consequences into this process, the defense and prosecution 
may well be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the 
interests of both parties.  As in this case, a criminal episode 
may provide the basis for multiple charges, of which only a 
subset mandate deportation following conviction.  Counsel 
who possess the most rudimentary understanding of the 
deportation consequences of a particular criminal offense may 
be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order 
to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of 
deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that 
automatically triggers the removal consequence.  At the same 
time, the threat of deportation may provide the defendant with 
a powerful incentive to plead guilty to an offense that does not 
mandate that penalty in exchange for a dismissal of a charge 
that does.110
106. See State v. LeMere, 2016 WI 41, ¶ 69, 368 Wis. 2d 624, 662, 879 N.W.2d 580, 598?99; 
Johnson, supra note 73, at 941; Murray, supra note 74, at 1142. 
107. UCCCA, supra note 11, § 5 (requiring notice before guilty plea); id. § 6 (requiring notice 
at sentencing and upon release). 
108. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARD, supra note 10, Standard 19-2.3(a) (requiring notice 
before a plea of guilty); id. Standard 19-2.4(b) (requiring notice at sentencing). 
109. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 11, § 6x.04(1) (requiring notice at 
sentencing). 
110. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010). 
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While Padilla addressed deportation, other significant consequences, such 
as loss of professional licenses,111 forfeitures,112 and even loss of civil rights,113
can also be bargained over. 
Because the subjects of plea agreements are not limited to traditional 
criminal punishment, it w????? ??? ?????????? ??? ????????? ???????? ??????????
responsibilities.  An effective lawyer can use collateral consequences to 
mitigate other aspects of the sentence, or as the Court suggested in Padilla,
bargain toward a conviction with less onerous collateral consequences.  
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????114
Competent private criminal practitioners, and public defenders in offices 
recognizing the impact of collateral consequences, use collateral consequences 
in their negotiations.115  This may mean obtaining diversion or pleading to a 
crime that avoids a serious collateral consequence, agreeing to a penalty that is 
reduced in light of a serious collateral consequence, or of course, obtaining 
nothing at all from a prosecutor who considers a plea offer and charge fair and 
just as is.  But there is no reason that large numbers of clients should act in 
ignorance of the legal consequences of their decisions, or that their attorneys 
should categorically forgo a consideration which, in some cases, would have 
led to a better plea agreement.  
2. Sentencing 
Under most systems, a judge can impose a sentence from among a range of 
possibilities. Sometimes discretion is limited by guidelines or mandatory 
111. Ex parte Reed, Nos. WR?50,961?04, WR?50,961?05, 2009 WL 97260, *4 (Tex. Crim. 
App. Jan. 14, ?????? ???????????? ????? ???????? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ?????????? In re
Meyers, 562 N.Y.S.2d 502, 502?03 (App. Div. 1990) (discussing resignation from bar as part of plea 
bargain). 
112. Libretti v. Wyoming Attorne?????????????????????????????????????????????? ?discussing 
forfeiture of property as part of plea agreement). 
113. City of Baldwin v. Barrett, 458 S.E.2d 619, 621 (Ga. 1995) (discussing a loss of the right 
to hold public office). 
114. Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 245, 
250, 266?67 (2016); see also Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775, 
775?76 (2016); Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1200 (2016); 
Brian M. Murray, Prosecutorial Responsibility and Collateral Consequences, 12 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 
213, 215, 237 (2016). 
115. Caprice R. Jenerson, Considering Collateral Consequences in Your Representation,
CHAMPION, Nov. 2016, at 47, 47?48 ?????? ????????? ???????????? ??? ????????? ???????? ????????
(NACDL) proposes that the avoidance and mitigation of collateral consequences are integral parts of 
???????????????????????????????????????????
2018] COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 251 
minimum sentence provisions,116 but it is rare that conviction inexorably leads 
to a single lawful penalty.117  Judges choose among lawful sentences by 
examining statutory factors118 and general principles of sentencing, which are 
broad.119  Because courts can consider almost everything when exercising their 
sentencing discretion, they have always had the power to take into 
consideration that the defendant would be subject to collateral consequences.  
There is some evidence that collateral consequences are moving toward 
becoming a more formal sentencing factor.120  The ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice provide: ???? legislature should authorize the sentencing court to take 
into account, and the court should consider, applicable collateral sanctions in 
????????????????????????????????????????????121  The commentary explains that 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????122  The Model Penal 
Code also brings collateral consequences into the sentencing process.123
In a highly publicized 2016 decision, United States v. Nesbeth,124 Senior 
Judge Frederic Block of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York considered collateral consequences in imposing a sentence: 
I have imposed a one-year term of probation.  In fixing this 
term, I have also considered the collateral consequences Ms. 
Nesbeth would have faced with a longer term of probation, 
such as the curtailment of her right to vote and the inability to 
visit her father and grandmother in Jamaica because of the loss 
of her passport during her probationary term.125
116. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Guidelines, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
supra note *, at 95, 97, 99; Erik Luna, Mandatory Minimums, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
supra note * at 117, 119. 
117. See Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note *, at 1790???????????????????????????????????
crimes, the most severe and long-lasting effect of conviction is not imprisonment or fine.  Rather, it is 
being subjected to collateral consequences involving the actual or potential loss of civil rights, parental 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
118. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(D) (West 2010). 
119. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244?45, 247 (1949); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick 
& Douglas A. Berman, Towards a Theory of Mitigation, 96 B.U. L. REV. 161, 162 (2016). 
120. For state and federal drug offenses, collateral consequences are at issue in every sentencing.  
A little-known federal statute, 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2012), allows sentencing judges to deny federal 
benefits to those convicted of possession or distribution offenses. 
121. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARD, supra note 10, Standard 19-2.4(a). 
122. Id. Standard 19-2.4 cmt. at 29.  
123. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 11, §§ 6x.02(2), 6x.04. 
124. 188 F. Supp. 3d 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
125. Id. at 194?95. 
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Because courts consider other personal circumstances when imposing a 
sentence, it is hard to see why they should categorically ignore collateral 
consequences provided by law. 
C. Relief From Collateral Consequences 
The ABA,126 the Model Penal Code,127 and the UCCCA128 all contemplate 
means of relieving individual collateral consequences to facilitate 
rehabilitation, reentry, and self-support.  For example, if all people convicted 
of felonies may be excluded from public housing, some mechanism should be 
available for a nonviolent offender to live in public housing so long as there is 
a realistic basis to believe that it will facilitate self-support and presents no 
unreasonable risk to public safety.  In addition, all of the groups contemplate 
broader relief if rehabilitation is indicated by the passage of time, completion 
?????????????????????????????????????????????129
The law of most jurisdictions has always provided for executive, legislative, 
or judicial relief.130  There is evidence that relief improves employment 
outcomes.131  The federal system has no established relief measure other than a 
126. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARD, supra note 10, Standard 19-2.5(a) (waiver of 
individual consequence); id. Standard 19-2.5(c) (relieving all collateral consequences). 
127. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 11, § ????????? ???????? ??? ?????????? id.
§ ???????????????????????????????????????????????
128. UCCCA, supra note 11, § ???????????????????????????????
129. UCCCA, supra note 11, § ??? ?????????????? ??? ???????????? ??? ????????? MODEL PENAL 
CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 11, § ????????????????????????????????????????????????ABA CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STANDARD, supra note 10, Standard 19-2.5(c) (relieving all collateral consequences); see also
Wayne A. Logan, Database Infamia: Exit from the Sex Offender Registries, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 219, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
based on law-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.
130. Restoration of Rights—National Resources, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR.,
http://ccresourcecenter.org/resources-2/restoration-of-rights/ [https://perma.cc/K24N-QPPK] (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2018). 
131. See Peter Leasure & Tia Stevens Andersen, The Effectiveness of Certificates of Relief as 
Collateral Consequence Relief Mechanisms: An Experimental Study, 35 YALE L. & POL?Y REV. INTER 
ALIA 11, 22 (2016); see also Jeffrey Selbin, Justin McCrary & Joshua Epstein, Unmarked? Criminal 
Record Clearing and Employment Outcomes, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 46 (2018) 
(suggesting that relief mechanisms improve employment outcomes). But cf. Lucy Gubernick, Note, 
Erasing the Mark of Cain—An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Ban-the-Box Legislation on the 
Employment Outcomes of People of Color with Criminal Records, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1153, 1200 
??????? ???????????? ??????????????? ????? ??????????????????????-the-box laws have been extremely 
positive . . . [n]o evaluation was working with baseline data to demonstrate the climate of ex-offender 
hiring locally . . . and few measured changes over time, so it is impossible to determine from the 
research alone the impact of the ?????????????.
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presidential pardon, a matter that has proved frustrating for some federal 
courts.132
D. Eliminating Unnecessary Collateral Consequences 
Collateral consequences have developed piecemeal, not systematically.133
Because of the limited judicial review, legislatures have not had to articulate 
the reasons for their enactment or evaluate their effectiveness or costs.134  It 
seems that collateral consequences are sometimes imposed casually, without 
full consideration of how they fit into a system of punishment, reentry, 
employment, and protection of the public.135
Bar organizations agree that jurisdictions should refine collateral 
consequences and eliminate ones that are unnecessary.  The Model Penal Code 
proposes that disenfranchisement be prohibited, or limited to the period of 
imprisonment, and that jury disqualification be limited to periods of 
correctional control.136  The ABA proposes that convicted persons not be 
disenfranchised, except during confinement,137 and ?????????????????????????????
???????????? ??? ??????????? ????????? ?????????? ???????????? ??? ?????138 or for 
?????????????? ????????? ????????? ??? ??????????? ???????? ????? ????????? ????? ???
???????????????????????????????????????139
Jurisdictions, equipped with comprehensive collections of collateral 
consequences, should ensure they are structured to promote public safety, both 
by protecting the public from harmful individuals and by leaving room for 
people with convictions to lead law-abiding lives.  The connection between the 
consequence and the reduction of the risk has often been based not on evidence, 
but, rather, on intuition or assumptions based on perceived logic.140
132. For example, in the Eastern District of New York, then-Judge John Gleason concluded that 
there was no available mechanism to help these worthy applicants.  He expunged the conviction of one
applicant and issued a certificate of rehabilitation to another. Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 
448, 457?58 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated, 833 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Doe v. United States, 
168 F. Supp. 3d 427, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). 
133. See Chin, Making Padilla Practical, supra note *, at 676. 
134. See Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note *, at 1807?11. 
135. Id. at 1831. 
136. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 11, § 6x.03. 
137. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARD, supra note 10, Standard 19-2.6(a). 
138. Id. Standard 19-2.6(e). 
139. Id. Standard 19-2.6(f). 
140. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, “Frightening and High”: The Supreme Court’s 
Crucial Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 495, 497, 499 (2015) (discussing 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-offense rates (and 
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Increasingly, however, risk can be measured and evaluated.141  A number of 
studies show that the risk of reoffending diminishes with time since criminal 
involvement.142  There is also evidence that a provisionally hired employee who 
clears a state-mandated criminal background check has a reduced likelihood of 
future arrest; that is, not imposing the collateral consequence has a positive 
public-safety effect.143  In addition, a recent study suggests that the 
disqualifications imposed by statutes do not match up to the decisions that 
would be reached based on use of empirical data about criminal records and 
reoffending.144  It may well be that individuals can get a fairer shake, and public 
safety can be better protected, if decision makers consider empirically reliable 
factors such as the time since criminal involvement and evidence of law-abiding 
behavior, rather than using categorical bars based on conviction of particular 
crimes.  
IV. THE SPUR OF LITIGATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Legislatures and courts make the laws, not civic groups, no matter how 
distinguished that group may be.  Nevertheless, the problems identified by the 
ABA, ALI and ULC have also been recognized by courts.  Clearly the most 
i??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Padilla v. 
Kentucky, holding that counsel had an obligation to advise noncitizen clients 
about the possibility of deportation following a conviction.145  More recently, 
the effectiveness of counseling programs in reducing it) was just the unsupported assertion of someone 
??????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
141. See generally John Monahan, Risk Assessment in Sentencing, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, supra note *, at 77. 
142. Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread 
Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 328?29 (2009); Shawn D. Bushway, Paul 
Nieuwbeerta & Arjan Blokland, The Predictive Value of Criminal Background Checks: Do Age and 
Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 52 (2011); Megan C. Kurlychek, 
Shawn D. Bushway & Robert Brame, Long-Term Crime Desistence and Recidivism Patterns—
Evidence from the Essex County Convicted Felon Study, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 71, 96 (2012). 
143. Megan Denver, Garima Siwach & Shawn D. Bushway, A New Look at the Employment and 
Recidivism Relationship Through the Lens of a Criminal Background Check, 55 CRIMINOLOGY 174, 
196 (2017); see also Megan Denver, Evaluating the Impact of “Old” Criminal Conviction Decision 
Guidelines on Subsequent Employment and Arrest Outcomes, 54 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 379, 380 
(2017). 
144. Garima Siwach, Shawn D. Bushway & Megan Kurlychek, Legal Mandates in Criminal 
Background Checks: An Evaluation of Disparate Impact in New York State, 2?3 (June 14, 2017) 
(unpublished  manuscript),  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2986384 
[https://perma.cc/LPM8-L8DN]. 
145. 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010). 
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in Packingham v. North Carolina,146 a decision invalidating a prohibition on 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
troubling fact that the law imposes severe restrictions on persons who already 
have served their sentence and are no longer subject to the supervision of the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????147
Padilla involved deportation, arguably a special case because of the 
seriousness of the consequence, and Packingham was dicta, an aside.  Yet, since 
Padilla there has been a stream of lower court cases invalidating collateral 
consequences or their retroactive application.  In addition, scholars of collateral 
consequences have hammered away at doctrines insulating collateral 
consequences from ordinary restraints on criminal law or constitutional review.  
A. Due Process Notice  
A number of cases bring collateral consequences into the due process notice 
regime surrounding plea bargains.  Thus, collateral consequences are treated 
like prison or other traditional elements of the sentence rather than something 
completely distinct from the criminal case.  For example, the Illinois Supreme 
Court held that defense counsel has a duty to advise a person pleading guilty 
that civil commitment may be a consequence.148  The Michigan Supreme Court 
held that a person pleading guilty was entitled to rely on the fact that the offense 
did not require registration, and therefore registration could not retroactively be 
146. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). 
147. Id. at 1737.  In another notable recent decision, Justice Gorsuch was skeptical of the idea 
that civil sanctions should be systematically subject to more lenient constitutional review than criminal 
ones: 
[I]f the severity of the consequences counts when deciding the standard of review, 
shouldn't we also take account of the fact that today's civil laws regularly impose 
penalties far more severe than those found in many criminal statutes?  Ours is a 
world filled with more and more civil laws bearing more and more extravagant 
punishments. ???????? ???????? ?????????? ???????? ????????????? ??????? ?????
compensatory fines, forfeiture provisions that allow homes to be taken, remedies 
that strip persons of their professional licenses and livelihoods, and the power to 
commit persons against their will indefinitely.  Some of these penalties are 
routinely imposed and are routinely graver than those associated with misdemeanor 
crimes?and often harsher than the punishment for felonies. 
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1229 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
148. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a minimal duty to advise a defendant who pleads guilty to a triggering offense subject to the provision 
of the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act that he will be evaluated for and may risk involuntary 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
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imposed upon him.149  In another vein, the Fourth Circuit held that a North 
Carolina statutory prohibition on sex offender presence in places where 
children gather was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.150
B. Ex Post Facto 
Another group of cases holds that sex offender restrictions were sufficiently 
punitive that they constitute ex post facto laws.151  As the Sixth Circuit recently 
stated: 
SORA [Sex Offender Registration Act] brands registrants as 
moral lepers solely on the basis of a prior conviction.  It 
consigns them to years, if not a lifetime, of existence on the 
margins, not only of society, but often, as the record in this case 
makes painfully evident, from their own families, with whom, 
due to school zone restrictions, they may not even live.  It 
directly regulates where registrants may go in their daily lives 
and compels them to interrupt those lives with great frequency 
in order to appear in person before law enforcement to report 
even minor changes to their information.152
C. New Constitutional Arguments  
In addition to cases, there is also a body of legal scholarship trying to 
generate more cases, arguing that in various ways constitutional doctrine should 
scrutinize collateral consequences more closely. 
1. Proportionality 
One line of scholarly criticism of collateral consequences has argued that a 
more searching standard of review should apply to collateral consequences.153
149. ???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
guilty on the basis of t?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
effective date), was assigned to HYTA training by the trial judge, and successfully completed his 
HYTA training, retroactive application of SORA deprived defendant of the benefits under HYTA to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
150. Doe v. Cooper, 842 F.3d 833, 838 (4th Cir. 2016).  See generally Maurice Chammah, 
Making the Case Against Banishing Sex Offenders, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 5, 2016), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/10/05/making-the-case-against-banishing-sex-
offenders#.Ua2JlXziP [https://perma.cc/8XED-78FZ]. 
151. Does v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1222?23 (Pa. 2017) (finding statute ex post facto and 
citing cases from Alaska, Indiana, and Maryland), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 925 (2018). 
152. Snyder, 834 F.3d at 705.   
153. See Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 301, 301 (2015). 
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Sandra Mayson has argued that collateral consequences should not be regarded 
as punishment, but instead as preventative risk regulation.154  However, given 
the presumtion of liberty and moral agency, the reasonableness of the 
regulations should be tested:  
[R]eview would require the government to show, at the least, 
that the conviction classification was substantially related to an 
important government interest.  The core benefit would be to 
strip CCs of the presumption of constitutionality and require 
the defending government to explain the need, in context, for 
classifying people for disparate treatment on the basis of past 
conviction alone.  This approach would expose the tradeoffs 
between risk and liberty that CCs make and the judgments 
behind them, and provide some oversight.  It would allow 
courts to both recognize CCs as an alarming form of risk 
regulation and also engage in case-by-case adjudication.  It 
would function as a rough requirement o?? ??????????????????
between the harm to be avoided and the burden imposed.155
On this approach, broad bans, unlimited in time, would be likely to fail, 
while targeted, tailored restrictions would be likely to survive.156
2. Civil Death 
I have argued that the susceptibility of convicted persons to lifetime 
restriction of their rights amounts to a revival of the ancient punishment of civil 
death.157  Civil death was understood to be a punishment historically.158  As a 
result, all persons charged with and pleading guilty to a felony or misdemeanor 
must be informed by counsel and the court that their rights with respect to 
employment, public benefits, licensing, family relationships, and all other areas 
subject to legal regulation, perhaps including liberty itself, will always 
thereafter be contingent.159
154. Id.
155. Id. at 359. 
156. Id. at 359?60; see also Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a 
Constitutional Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal 
Records, 7 J.L. SOC?Y 18, 19?20 (2005). 
157. See Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note *. 
158. Id. at 1816?19. 
159. Id. at 1826?30.  This article has been considered by courts. See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????he 65 
???????? ?????????? ????? ??? ??????? ??????? ???? ??????????? ???? ??????? ??????? ??? ??????????????? ???
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Chin, The New Civil 
Death, supra note *, at 1805)); United States v. Brank, 2018 WL 732704, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 6, 2018) 
???????????? ??????????????? ??????????????????????? ????????? ?????????? ?????????????????????????????????
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3. Grand Jury Consideration of Misdemeanors 
I also argue in a recent paper160 that what mak??????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
on reputation, as measured by such things as collateral consequences.161
Accordingly, if this argument is correct, stigmatizing misdemeanors charged in 
federal court, such as those involving drugs, sex offenses, or loss of civil rights, 
licenses, or permits, can only be prosecuted based on a grand jury indictment. 
4.  Attacking the Distin????????????????????????????????????????????
Punishment 
A number of scholars have begun to question the distinction between direct 
punishments and collateral consequences, calling into question the entire 
regime of special treatment for collateral consequences.  Joshua Kaiser 
????????????????????????????????????????????????argely through circular logic, 
tautology, mis-citation of precedent, and bald assertion without any supporting 
facts or arguments,?????????????????, ?????????????????????????????????????????????
are difficult to apply and nonsensical when compared with commonsense 
?????????????????????????????????????????????162
D. The Legislative Response 
Subjection of new collateral consequences to ex post facto limitations, and 
even holding that a state or federal constitutional provision requires notice of 
similar civil statutes, such as immigration laws) narrowly, because we recognize their especially 
weighty cons????????? ???? ????????????? ???????  Our jurisprudence must take into account both the 
severity of criminal penalties themselves and the web of collateral consequences that attend a criminal 
conviction?the potential for loss of voting rights; restrictions on movement; difficulty in obtaining 
employment, apartment leases, and admission to professional organizations; and, in many cases, the 
possibility of deportation to a place that is not now and may never have been home?with all the 
anguish and hardship that attends the prospect of permanent separation from family, and the anxiety 
?????????????????? ???? ????????????????????? ????????????? (citing Chin, The New Civil Death, supra
note *, at 1799?1803). 
160. Gabriel J. Chin & John Ormonde, Infamous Misdemeanors and the Grand Jury Clause, 102 
MINN. L. REV. 1911 (2018). 
161. Id. at 1914?15. 
162. Joshua Kaiser, We Know It When We See It: The Tenuous Line Between “Direct 
Punishment” and “Collateral Consequences”, 59 HOW. L.J. 341, 343 (2016); see also, e.g., Raff 
Donelson, Cruel and Unusual What? Toward A Unified Definition of Punishment, 9 WASH. U. JUR.
REV. 1, 33 (2016); Zachary Hoskins, Ex-Offender Restrictions, 31 J. APPLIED PHIL. 33, 33 (2014); 
John G. Malcolm, The Problem with the Proliferation of Collateral Consequences, 19 FEDERALIST 
SOC?Y REV. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
public safety, many others have a tenuous connection to public safety and appear to be more punitive 
???????????????????????????
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collateral consequences, by no means completely resolves the problem.  As 
important as those changes may be in individual cases, they are incremental 
with respect to the system as a whole and to the tens of millions of people 
validly subject to existing collateral consequences.  Even constitutional 
limitations do not prevent imposition of collateral consequences once the limits 
have been satisfied.163  Courts have no authority to rewrite or invalidate 
otherwise constitutional laws in the name of good policy.164  Courts work at the 
margins, at best trimming collateral consequences to the extent that they are 
unconstitutional, or interpreting laws to avoid constitutional doubts.165
Nevertheless, the court decisions represent an important signal in at least 
two dimensions.  First, if some collateral consequences are brought into the 
criminal justice system?say, by requiring notice of deportation or of sex 
offender incarceration?it requires little additional time or effort to mention 
other important consequences.  Many lawyers are likely to include warning and 
counseling as part of their practice even in the absence of a legal requirement, 
whether as a matter of good practice, for fear that the legal requirement may be 
coming, or both.166
In addition, court decisions have the potential to signal that legislation is 
needed (just as legislation may signal to courts that problems worthy of 
attention to doctrine may exist).  Legislatures seem to share the same concerns 
about collateral consequences as courts.  Legislation mitigating collateral 
consequences is increasing in the states.167  The Collateral Consequences 
Resource Center has issued two major reports on state laws dealing with 
restoration of rights.  The c???????????????????????????????????2016, concluded 
??????[s]ince 2013, almost every state has taken at least some steps to chip away 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
163. See Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note *, at 1810?11. 
164. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1949 (2016); United States v. 
Rutherford, 442 U.S. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
as councils of revision, empowered to rewrite legislation in accord with their own conceptions of 
?????????????????????????
165. See People v. Temelkoski, 905 N.W.2d 593, 594 (Mich. 2018); see also Doe v. Cooper, 842 
F.3d 833, 838 (4th Cir. 2016); Does v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. 
Ct. 55 (2017); Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1222 (Pa. 2017) (finding statute ex post facto 
and citing cases from Alaska, Indiana, and Maryland), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 925 (2018). 
166. See Chin, Making Padilla Practical, supra note *, at 688?90; see also Jenerson, supra note 
?????????????[C]ounsel bears a professional and ethical responsibility to advocate for the client during 
the adversarial process and investigate the impact of collateral consequences, inform the client and the 
court, and mitigate and/or avoid those consequences in plea bargaining and sentencing when 
???????????
167. See Corda, supra note 52, at 20. 
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living, access housing, education and public benefits, and otherwise fully 
participate in civil socie????168  The c???????? ????? ??????? ?????? ????? ???????
national trend toward expanding opportunities for restoration of rights and 
status after conviction . . . ?????????????????????????169
V. CONCLUSION
Collateral consequences have proliferated in state and federal law, creating 
a vast network of restrictions on people with convictions.  For many people 
convicted of crime, the collateral consequences will present the greatest burden.  
For decades, the legal system largely ignored collateral consequences.  For the 
most part, legislatures generated them on an ad hoc basis, courts treated them 
as outside the criminal justice system, and the organized bar paid them little 
attention.  There is no reason to hope that creation of, imposition of, 
enforcement, of and relief from collateral consequences will become a 
considered and crafted feature of the legal system.  If so, society will benefit 
from improved public safety, avoidance of unnecessary recidivism, and 
reintegration of people with convictions into the community.
If the United States is at a golden moment with respect to collateral 
consequences, where important participants in the legal system agree that 
reform is desirable, nevertheless we are just at the beginning of that moment.  
It will take years until collateral consequences are trimmed to those that are 
effective and necessary, relief is regularly available to the deserving, and those 
willing to work hard can move beyond their criminal records.  For the first time 
in some time, however, those things seem like possibilities rather than fantasies.
168. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., supra note 16, at 1. 
169. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., SECOND CHANCE REFORMS IN 2017: ROUNDUP 
OF NEW EXPUNGEMENT AND RESTORATION LAWS 1 (2017), http://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/Second-Chance-Reforms-in-2017-CCRC-Dec-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NPP6-U7NJ]; see also Brian M. Murray, A New Era for Expungement Law Reform? 
Recent Developments at the State and Federal Levels, 10 HARV. L. & POL?Y REV. 361, 369 (2016). 
